

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

WITH

THE FREE TOWN

OF

CRACOW.

Full do 1835/10

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General Treaty of Vienna.

Additional Treaty relating to Cracow concluded on the 21st of April (3rd of May), 1815.

ACCUSTOMED as we are to the sinister and unscrupulous manœuvres of Russian diplomacy, which have, for the last twenty years, been more boldly designed, and more ably executed than those of any other power in Europe, we think that the secret and gradual influence of the court of St. Petersburg has attracted less attention than it deserves; whilst even the more brilliant successes of its armies and its fleet have been regarded with a sluggish or a despondent apathy, by the statesmen of Europe. The secret influence to which we here more especially allude, is that which the councils of Russia have exercised, and are still exercising, upon those cities, provinces, and states, over which it has acquired by treaty, or assumed by force, an ostensible right of protection. Wherever a right of this kind was obtained by Russia at the settlement of Europe, in 1815, in conjunction with other powers, the influence of those powers has been paralysed, as surely as that of the northern court, or of its most intimate allies, has been promoted; until it could be safely abused, and converted into a more absolute display of authority. Whenever the cities and provinces of some other power have been made the object of this protection, Russia has affected to look upon the duties or the privileges of its charge as equivalent to actual co-domination; and it has begun its own work of subjugation by conferring a species of semi-independence upon those provinces, which were first detached from their habits and practice of allegiance to their former master, by the perfidious suggestions or skilful policy of their future oppressor. Greece, Moldavia, Wallachia, Servia, and a number of other tracts of country, not less favoured by natural and commercial advantages than these, have already been impelled to assert their independence, or supported in the maintenance of rights which they trust may one day confirm their entire emancipation. The suggestions which have awakened or fostered a spirit of disaffection in these provinces,

have had the two-fold aim, and the two-fold advantage of detaching them from the Ottoman Empire, and thereby weakening the power of the Porte, whilst they have themselves been prepared for a further change, more directly advantageous to Russia. For the powerful assistance and interested encouragement which has enabled them to attain their present semi-independence—a state which their imperfect resources, and backward civilisation, renders them but little fit to maintain—are only the preludes to their ultimate and absolute subjugation by a power which is ever ready to barter the temporary support of arms and counsel, for the constant and precious birth-right of national independence. If we go back to the history of the separation of Poland itself—where the more recent aggressions of brutal force are apt to make us forget the long and early aggressions of intrigue—we shall find the same ready zeal on the part of the Muscovites to protect, and the same unfailing progress from advice to protection, from protection to the rigours of oppression, domination, and final destruction.

The case, indeed, is not exactly illustrative of our remark, which was applied more especially to the arts by which the Russian policy wrests a portion of territory and population from the sway of another prince, or the protection of other nations, before any party, except the false guardian and active plunderer, is aware of the change. It is, however, evident that a state, a province, or a nation, which enjoys the protection of one or more powers, foreign to its own immediate sovereign, may, and, to a certain extent, must, be considered as placed in a state of *transition*. Under these circumstances, a change will sooner or later take place, by which it will either dispense with that protection of the two or more powers, which it previously enjoyed; or it will be subjected to the more exclusive interference and direction of one of its protectors. This consequence is inevitable, it belongs to the very nature of political relations, and it is corroborated by the most constant experience. But it is sufficiently clear, that the conduct, or at least the secret agency of the power possessing, or aspiring to possess, the larger share of authority, must exercise the greatest possible influence on the issue of this change. Unfortunately, the experience of the last few years shows

that Russia alone has had the art of turning the modification to her own advantage, whilst her co-adjutors have either not been unprincipled enough to rival her projects, or not bold enough to counteract them. The nations over which she already extends her protecting sway are rapidly shaking off the bonds of their old allegiance, but they are still unconscious of the secret disease which consumes the inner springs of their national existence. If treaties have awarded a joint right, and accordingly imposed a joint duty of protection, upon foreign powers over any Russian subjects, or over such provinces as are destined to be swallowed up in the empire, Russia has always found means to render that protection ineffectual; the rights which it established have been disused or forgotten by the other parties, in proportion as they have been exerted and abused by her; until the state of semi-independence, which those treaties established and promised to maintain, has been succeeded by one of absolute and lasting subjection.

The example of Poland—of the country which occupied so prominent a place in the General Treaty of Vienna, and of the nation which was specified in that Treaty as the “*Polonais de l’ancienne Pologne telle qu’elle était avant 1772,*” (the period of the first partition),—the example of Poland, indeed, is uppermost in our minds, whenever we speak of the encroaching ability of Russia, and of the ineffectual guaranty which the pledged faith and subscription of assembled Europe has been found to afford. But however little inclined we may be to justify the plea of inability, which has been urged by some of the contracting powers of the Treaty of Vienna; however we may be disposed to deplore the want of alacrity and energy, with which the representations of England and of France were made—those representations which should have been remonstrances, strengthened by all the dignity of our national promise, and all the dangers to which the events of that time expose our foreign relations;—however convinced we may be that the conditions upon which the Polish nation was given over to the three powers by the other contracting parties were never duly enforced, nor their infractions pointed out for redress; we are ready to admit that the objection which the governments of France and England, parties to the Treaty, make

to taking those steps to which they were morally and politically bound, was a specious one. They asserted, that nothing was more difficult than to maintain, or to regulate, the relations between a sovereign nation and a dependent state, by foreign interference. It is true, that this assertion throws no small degree of blame upon the treaty itself, and upon the foresight of those by whom it was concluded; since it at once denies the existence of that compensation which they proffered to the Polish nation for its independent existence, and abandons that people to the supreme pleasure of its first enemies. But the objection is by no means void of foundation, for in order to remedy the mischief the treaty itself must have been discussed, its imperfections revealed, and its provisions and expressions so changed, in conformity to the spirit by which it was first dictated, as to ensure a more exact compliance with the wishes of the contracting parties for the future. Difficult as the task of enforcing the stipulations of that treaty is now asserted to be, and arduous as the fulfilment of the moral obligation which the contracting parties had imposed upon themselves was found to become, it is incontestable that the most ordinary precautions were not taken in the affair. The solicitude of that English cabinet which first demanded the existence of "an independent power established in Poland, under a distinct dynasty of its own," and afterwards appeared in the light of a protector and of a security for the existence of Polish institutions; or the slightest reflection, on the part of the minister, must have demonstrated the duty which he had contracted, of maintaining a diplomatic agent upon the spot. Without an agent of this kind, the protective functions of England and France became a mere abstraction: the infractions of the contract they had signed, were matters of hearsay. But the presence of individuals empowered to represent the influence which those courts thought proper to assert in 1815, might have tempered the sway of the sovereign to whom they would have been accredited; might have kept alive the sparks of a liberal and hopeful feeling in the minds of the governed; might have prevented frequent and early collisions; or lastly, might have signalled the flagrant abuses of authority, before it was too late to obtain redress. Had such envoys existed, the state of Poland would have been known to the cabinets of

western Europe; the insurrection might have been foreseen, and must have been better understood; and the policy of England and France, during the struggle, would not have been hood-winked by their unparalleled ignorance of the long oppression which preceded it. Such is not the policy of Russian protection; unlike the distant and neglectful promises of England and of France, she does not bury her eggs in the sand, and imagine her work to be accomplished; but by unceasing vigilance, she perfects every project her monarchs have ever conceived; using the wariest means of beguiling the shepherd, and the surest of seizing her prey; profiting as much by the omissions of her antagonists as by her own fertile schemes; nay, even turning the hostile designs in which they have not patience or skill to persevere to her own ultimate aggrandisement. It is not our intention to recall the numerous instances in which the Russian cabinet has swept away the impediments or baffled the precautions of other powers, which, by some strange mis-management, more fatal than Russian artifice, have been set up too early, or recollected too late. The time will come, when every successive step of Russian dominion, when every line of territory which has been won by a power so accustomed in the words of the poet to

‘ S'appuyer sur l'obstacle, et s'élançer plus loin,'

will be traced back to the faults and failings of the indifferent stewards and sleepy warders of the civilised states of Europe. But our more immediate purpose is to point out the last outwork, which is still tenable in that frontier fortress of western Europe which we have lost; and to describe the position of a state, declared to be “ a free, independent, and strictly neutral “ town,” by the eight powers which assented and subscribed to the Treaty of Vienna, whilst it was placed by its constitution under the more immediate protection of three of those powers. We allude to the ancient city of Cracow.

It would be difficult to determine the exact motives which gave rise to this last stipulation, and which placed a limit to the independence of that little state, by placing it under the special protection of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Those motives were, unquestionably, very different in the minds of the several contracting parties of the Treaty of Vienna; although the more evident and assignable reason was the

jealousy of the three surrounding powers, who were equally interested in preserving the strict neutrality of the territory of Cracow. But, however this may be, the functions of the protecting powers were determined by a Constitution which was, from this very circumstance, appended to the General Act of the Treaty of Vienna, and declared to constitute an 'integral part of the arrangements of the Congress' (Article 118). The future destiny of Cracow, and the form of its constitution, were not regulated by a special treaty concluded between the three protecting powers, but by the general assent of all the Courts of Europe. Now this was clearly intended to show, that, although the northern powers were specially interested in the preservation of the *neutrality* of that territory (which was consequently assigned to their guardianship), the other contracting parties were no less interested in maintaining the two former conditions of *freedom and independence*, which were solemnly conferred upon the town of Cracow; and of maintaining these conditions against the possible aggressions of the triple protectorate itself, or any member of it. If such was the intention of the contracting parties, it remains for us to inquire how it has been realised.

The neutrality of the territory has been repeatedly violated by Russian authority in the most flagrant manner. But, without alluding to the frequent incursions and oppressive acts of the protecting powers, during more than fifteen years, we pass at once to more recent and more forcible instances. In 1831, a division of the Russian army, under the Generals Rüdiger and Krassowski, occupied that territory for two months. Pretexts were not wanting to justify this aggression, but the Austrian government remonstrated with great energy; and the Russian division at length quitted the territory, though it still remained upon the frontier. During this occupation every kind of abuse was perpetrated with impunity; the Bishop of Cracow, a prelate eminently distinguished for piety and virtue, was arrested in his palace, and kept in close confinement; it was with the greatest difficulty that he succeeded in transmitting two protests to Prince Metternich, and the Papal Nuncio at Vienna; and, during his detention, the vast and religious population of the city was deprived of the benefit of the sacraments of the Church. The Russian troops imposed

the cost of their maintenance upon the little Republic, and left lasting marks behind them of their contempt for the tranquillity of the town, and the opinion of the other powers of Europe. At length, however, Austria and Prussia acceded to the reiterated demands of Russia, which represented Cracow as a nest of disaffection, and an agreement was entered into, in 1832, by which it was determined, that in future troops should be held in readiness by each of the three powers, and that upon the demand of two of their resident agents, detachments, consisting of an equal number of men of each nation, should be allowed to occupy the territory of the Republic.

What opinion would be entertained—we will not say by statesmen—but by men of common sense and common feeling, if the neutrality of Switzerland, for instance, were guaranteed by a stipulation, authorising the invasion of its territory by a French, an Austrian, and a Sardinian army, provided the number of those troops were equal? Hitherto the fundamental principle of neutrality, as recognised by the law of nations, has been allowed to consist in the inviolable sanctity of the territory from all foreign invasion. But it was reserved for the ingenious constructions of Russian policy, to teach its allies and Europe this new method of preserving the *strict neutrality* of a state. And here we cannot forbear alluding to the skilful use which Russia makes of the *occasional* assent of her allies, to forward her own *invariable* ends. We do not question that the ultimate purpose of the Russian government is to occupy the territory of Cracow, to pluck the white eagle down from its last hold, and to break into the last refuge of the Polish language and the Polish name. To attain this fixed end, it will find means to turn the occasional compliance or present interest of one of the other two protecting powers to its own advantage; the demand of two of the residents will be followed by the occupation of the town; the remonstrances of the third party are paralysed beforehand by the arrangement of 1832; and when the Russian troops re-enter Cracow, a degree of jealousy will be sown between the consenting and the opposing ally, which may end in leaving the lion's share at its own disposal. However the neutrality of Cracow may be affected by such a measure, it is certain that the independence and liberty of that republic will be wholly lost; and if the

former be a subject of concern to the three powers alike, the latter is more peculiarly obnoxious to the purposes of Russia.

The object of the Congress of Vienna, in creating the independent state of Cracow, was to confer upon a very small portion of the Polish nation institutions fitted to maintain some vestiges of the national character*. The senate of the republic was elective; the banner of Poland still floated on those walls; and the University of Cracow was opened to the inhabitants of the adjacent Polish provinces for study (Additional Treaty of the 3rd May, 1815, art. 15), and the purposes of a

* The importance which was attached to the Constitution of Cracow at the Congress of Vienna, and the fact of its being the only document of the kind drawn up at that important conclave of European statesmen, and textually inserted in the Treaty, induce us to give our readers some idea of its contents. The reason of the remarkable attention paid to this subject by the plenipotentiaries of the greatest states in Europe was that it was regarded as a necessary counterpoise to the protecting authority then awarded to the three powers of the north.

The first articles of the Constitution proclaim the Roman Catholic religion to be that of the country, though all sects are tolerated alike, and all citizens are equal before the law. The government of the free town of Cracow consists in a Senate composed of twelve members, called Senators, and a President; nine of whom are chosen by the Representative Assembly, and the four others by the Chapter and the University. The elective franchise is possessed by the members of the secular clergy and the University, by all owners of real property paying a land-tax to the amount of fifty Polish florins, manufacturers, merchants, artists, and professors. The Representative Assembly thus elected was invested with a control over the expenditure of the state, the right of impeaching all public officers, and of deliberating on all laws which had previously been passed by the Senate. Article 12 directs that the Representative Assembly should immediately appoint a Committee to form a civil and criminal code, in which due attention is to be paid *to the localities of the countries, and the spirit of its inhabitants*. The judicial functionaries, composing the Tribunals of First Instance and of Appeal, were to be in part named for life, and in part elected by the townships. In some cases the University was empowered to refer causes a second time to the Court of Appeal. By the concluding articles, all public acts were to be drawn up in the Polish language; the revenues and expenditure of the University were declared to form part of the budget of the town; and the interior military service was to be conducted by the municipal militia, and a certain number of gens d'armes.

Such is a brief abstract of this document, which bore the date of the 3rd May, 1815, a day of evil augury to Polish freedom. It will be observed, that the protecting powers are not mentioned in the whole act; and that all the rights of legislation, taxation, justice, education, and public security, are vested in the inhabitants of the city. This, however, is now changed.

national education. But the constitution of the state has long been overlooked by the Commissioners of the protecting powers; and Russia has not only forbidden any of its Polish subjects to frequent the University, but has, on more than one occasion, removed individuals thence who had excited its supreme displeasure.

We may, perhaps, be required to produce authentic documents in support of our assertions; but in calling public attention to these facts, we freely confess that we have not the means of access to documents of this kind. We are bound to presume, that the agreement of the year 1832, to which we have alluded, was duly communicated to all the courts that subscribed the Treaty of Vienna, by which the freedom, independence, and neutrality of Cracow were acknowledged: we cannot but suppose that the substitution of another constitution by the three resident commissioners, for that which was declared to be an integral part of the Treaty of Vienna, is well known to the ministers of England and of France—although the threats, and hostile bayonets, by which that substitution was effected, may possibly have escaped their attention. The abrogation of the privileges of the University, the pillage of its libraries, and the arbitrary control exercised over its landed and funded property, as well as the numerous violations of the special and common rights of the inhabitants of that unfortunate, though free, independent, and strictly neutral city, cannot but have been matters of observation in the cabinets of Europe.

But if such were not the case—if the charms of novelty do indeed belong to the shameful and public occurrences we here denounce—if the courts which participated in the Treaty of Vienna, are only apprised of the breaches of that contract by rumour—and if the diplomatic relations, which they maintain with the protecting powers, are insufficient to check or to make known the abuses of that protecting authority—we do, indeed, feel ourselves justified in asking, how it comes to pass that the duty of maintaining a solemn pledge has been forgotten, and the suggestions of a clear and immediate interest, involving their own security, and the principles on which the politics of Europe rest, have been disregarded?

That all the contracting powers of the Congress of Vienna

enjoy an indefeasible right of forming any kind of relations with a state, which, like that of Cracow, has been declared to be free, independent, and sovereign: and that this right is not barred by the protecting authority of the three powers of the north, is an undoubted point of international law. To adduce an example, we may mention the commercial treaty which was recently concluded by Great Britain with the town of Frankfort; a town which has never professed to enjoy the exclusive and sovereign privileges with which Cracow was invested, and which is only possessed of a quasi-sovereignty under the Germanic confederation. Nor can the small extent of the state of Cracow be admitted to annul this right of independence, unless the validity of a contract is to be appreciated by the dimensions of the contracting parties, and unless Russia is to obtain by her size that preponderance which she seeks to establish by her arts.

That the contracting parties of the Treaty of Vienna, have incurred the moral duty of maintaining such relations as may be needful to prevent the abuses of that treaty, we have endeavoured to show.

Lastly, it remains for us to say something of the direct interest which those parties, and more especially the cabinets of England and of France, have in placing diplomatic agents at Cracow, who may be able to counterbalance the excessive influence of the resident commissioners of the three protecting powers. We shall not, for this purpose, enlarge on the commercial importance of the town. Though, indeed, placed as Cracow is, on the banks of a large navigable river, and in immediate contiguity to the commercial systems of Austria, Prussia, and Russia; exempted as it is from custom-house restrictions, by which means it serves as a market for goods prohibited in those countries; and favoured by all the natural productions of the adjacent provinces, such as wheat, zinc, timber, &c., this spot cannot but possess a certain degree of commercial importance, and furnish an important point for observation. Nevertheless, we do not hesitate to admit, that commercial motives alone would be insufficient to justify the establishment of a British or French consulate there. The missions which England and France are interested in sending to that spot, are more of a political than a commercial nature;

and the commercial motive could at best furnish a pretext for their establishment. But political interests, and the necessity of paying a vigilant attention to those conditions which the experience of the last twenty years has shown to be but too easily eluded, furnish imperious reasons for the measure we propose, and these it may be well openly and firmly to avow. The part which it befits the agents of England and of France to act at Cracow, requires that they should be placed, as much as possible, upon the same rank as the residents of the protecting powers. We shall conclude, by pointing out some of the principal objects which would necessarily and naturally claim their attention.

The little state of Cracow, with a territorial extent of 496 square miles, and a population of 120,000 inhabitants, is the only portion of the ancient kingdom of Poland, whose independence was recognised and guaranteed by Europe at the Congress of Vienna. The other provinces which once composed that empire, and which now contain a population of 20,000,000 of inhabitants, were divided into four distinct portions, and subjected to different sovereigns, under very different conditions. This arrangement, or to speak more correctly, this partition, was ratified in 1815, professedly with a view to the general interests of Europe; but at the same time, a feeling of justice, and possibly a presentiment of a future change, induced the contracting powers, in all the transactions of Vienna, to treat the Polish provinces as parts of one nation, connected by inseparable interests, and possessing common claims to the respect of stipulated rights at the hands of the several rulers, under whose sway the Poles had fallen. The nature of those rights is well known. But our present object induces us to remind the reader, that they were placed under the guaranty of all the contracting powers of the Treaty, and that the condition of the Polish nation must *ipso facto* be looked upon (in conformity with the principles we have already pointed out) as one of transition. That condition was such as must in time have brought about, either the gradual political regeneration of those several provinces and their ultimate reconstruction on the one hand, or the final destruction of their separate existence, by the gradual suppression of

the rights which were stipulated, but insufficiently guaranteed, by the powers of Europe. Until one or other of these results shall be obtained, and obtained in conformity with the spirit of the Treaty of Vienna, Poland must remain in a state of continued crisis. And we affirm without fear of contradiction, that the former alternative is the only one which does not violate the spirit and the letter of that treaty; the only one which the interests of England and of France can allow them to sanction; and at the same time, that nothing but decided and persevering measures can obtain a result which is no less important to the welfare of Europe, than it is essential to the maintenance of strict principles of international justice.

From what we have already remarked, it may easily be seen that the Free Town of Cracow, as it was constituted by the Treaty of Vienna, represents in miniature, and comprises within its narrow boundaries, the sole remnant of the provisions made by the Treaty of Vienna with regard to the four other portions of ancient Poland. The meaning of those provisions was clearly to waive the purpose of immediately recomposing the ancient monarchy, but to preserve its nationality unimpaired. The three powers to whom Poland was made over solemnly contracted to respect that nationality. Rigorous conditions were imposed upon them, as a *sine qua non*, with a view to enforce their observance of the promise. The same powers were also invested with the protectorate of the free town of Cracow, to which, not only its nationality, but its independence was secured; and this independence, added to the stipulations which opened the University of Cracow as a resort of study to the natives of the other provinces, cannot but be looked upon as an additional, and a most important guaranty, given to all the Poles for the maintenance of their nationality. For this reason the contracting powers, whose right, duty, and interest it is to maintain that nationality, are bound to pay especial attention to the fulfilment of those clauses of the Treaty of Vienna which concern the University of Cracow. Those clauses are, in themselves, of the utmost importance—an importance, which is increased by the gross violations to which they have been subjected, and by the total evasion of the end for which they were drawn up. Unless it

be admitted that the powers of the north are to construe and pervert treaties at their pleasure, the stipulations which have been so boldly broken, must at some future time be renewed by more effectual negotiations, and at the present moment they form no unfitting theme for just and warm remonstrance.

Cracow is then, as we have already observed, a point well adapted for commercial observation, and pre-eminently suited for a watchful attention to the political conduct of the three powers towards the Polish nation, which was surrendered to them by Europe IN TRUST. In consequence of the stipulations made in favour of the Polish interests, which to a certain extent affect the three powers alike, these three governments are united in a common opposition to the nation, and to those very stipulations which were made in its favour*. From no one spot can this united action, this summary bent of their policy with regard to Poland, and this determined prosecution of the means most conducive to its final annihilation, be so accurately observed as from Cracow. There the three protecting residents are to be seen actively at work, animated for the most part by an ominous unanimity, and yet distinguished by characteristic traits of policy, which may serve even better than more important proceedings, to betray the disposition of their respective governments, not only with regard to Poland, but with regard to some of the most serious matters of the policy of Europe. Cracow may justly be considered as having once more become the capital of Poland, as it was for ten centuries; and upon no other spot in that country, is it possible to collect permanent diplomatic representatives of all the great powers of Europe, at the present time. On this point alone is the independence of a Polish community ostensibly recognised; on this point alone, neither Cossack, nor Prussian, nor Austrian, can domineer, or indulge in unbridled violence, without infringing the treaties of a European Congress. In the capitals of the three powers we can only cope with them singly; but in Cracow, the agents of

* See the Convention of München Gratz, in 1834, for the reciprocal surrender of Poles, and the entry of the troops of the three powers upon their several territories in case of *disorder* in Poland.

a British government may contest the violations of plighted faith, and resist the united action of the councils of the Holy Alliance. There, and there alone, can we meet, under a palpable form, that Union which was founded in a criminal conspiracy, and has been cemented by the protectorate of Cracow (a circumstance which might have been turned to no bad account by proper management), and that coalition which exists indeed in the other parts of Poland, but which may escape your observation, and baffle your remonstrances elsewhere. If you urge, at Vienna, the maintenance of Polish nationality, and the representative institutions promised to the Poles by the 1st Article of the Treaty of Vienna, you can only be understood to allude to the Poles of Galicia; at Petersburg, and at Berlin, the claims which may be preferred apply in like manner to certain portions of Poland exclusively; but at Cracow, on the other hand, stipulations which interest all the Poles alike, may be enforced; and the representations which might be made would be addressed to the three protecting powers conjointly, to their residents acting in concert, and exercising, as such, a kind of usurped sovereignty over that little state, which it would be the duty of a diplomatic representative to reduce to a strict conformity with the limits of the protectorate, as laid down by the Treaty.

Nor are these the only reasons that can be alleged: Cracow presents still further advantages as a point of observation; it is a frequent and favourite residence of the Polish subjects of the three adjacent states; they seem to breathe more freely within its walls; the police of the three powers, though scarcely less inquisitorial, is less violent in its proceedings; the occurrences which take place in the other parts of Poland are discussed with more freedom, and by this means Cracow furnishes a rare opportunity of observing the separate policy of Austria, Prussia, and Russia.

We have already observed the use which Russia has made, and is still making, of the circumstance of her having two coadjutors, one or other of whom may always be ready to support her measures, and to overpower the resistance of the third. But this same circumstance might be made no less available in the hands of a foreign power, in enforcing the stipulations

which have been made in favour of Poland, by supporting the views of the minority. It is clear, that, since there were three parties to the original partition, two of those parties are always more intimately united to each other than they are to the third. The history of the last fifty years amply confirms this assertion, which is founded upon the nature of things.

At the time of the first partition, in 1772, the more intimate union subsisted between Russia and Prussia; Austria only consented to accept her share of the spoils. In 1790, Prussia was alarmed by the progress of Catherine in Turkey, and concluded an alliance at Warsaw against her. In 1799 and 1805, Austria and Russia fought together, whilst Prussia had concluded a separate peace with France. In 1812, there were bodies of Austrian and Prussian troops in Napoleon's great army which invaded Russia. In 1828, the anxiety and the jealousy with which Austria witnessed the passage of the Russians across the Balcan, did not allow her to desist from her warlike preparations until the peace of Adrianople was concluded. Lastly, at the present moment, it cannot be doubted that, of these three powers, Austria is the one which it may be the most easy to associate in the political interests of western Europe, as soon as the alarm with which she contemplates that alliance can be dispelled.

It is, moreover, evident that these alternations cannot but have exercised a degree of influence upon the condition of Polish affairs. The Poles have been mixed up in all the important changes which Europe has witnessed; and although sixty years have elapsed since the epoch of the first partition, they have not ceased to retain their weight in the scale of events. The modifications which have taken place in the policy of the three northern powers with regard to Poland, have served instantaneously to betray the occasional differences which have crept into their councils. As these modifications have been effected by administrative and domestic measures, they have invariably preceded the more overt demonstrations of international rivalry; but they have most frequently served merely to betray the existence of incipient dissention, which produced no adequate results, for want of being duly known and cultivated by the cabinets of the west.

These various considerations appear to us to show that it is incumbent on the powers which were parties to the Treaty of Vienna, to resolve, in concert, or severally, upon the appointment and immediate mission of agents, bearing the title of "CONSUL-GENERAL and RESIDENT at the free, independent, " and strictly neutral town of CRACOW."

POSTSCRIPT.

SINCE the preceding pages were published, we have been apprized, that the arguments by which we have attempted to demonstrate the propriety and the necessity of the speedy appointment of an accredited diplomatic agent of the British Government to the free town of Cracow, had already met with the most serious attention in another place. The question was, as we understand, formally brought before a Select Committee of the House of Commons, whose inquiries were peculiarly directed to our consular relations; and a proposition, tending to further the execution of the measure, was made in the Committee by a member of the present Administration. That Committee was composed of gentlemen of various parties, selected from all sides of the House, to investigate points of great importance to our national and commercial prosperity: but we have reason to believe that no opposition was offered to the proposal thus introduced, by the members of any party. It was assented to by the most rigid economists; and by Tories, whose line of politics renders them least apt to contest the influence, or cross the purposes, of Russia. And we trust, that when the report of this Committee sees the light, it will be found to contain an earnest recommendation of a measure, alike conducive to the maintenance of the past promises, and of the future interests, of England.

The only doubt which may arise in the minds of those who are enabled, and, we will add, are called upon, to carry this recommendation into effect, depends on a comparison of

the direct advantages of the measure itself, with the umbrage it may give the Russian Government. But even if the mission of a British agent to Cracow were likely to become a more serious ground of complaint than is really the case, it must never be forgotten that Russia is not, and never has been, kept at peace for want of a legitimate pretext for war. When her chances of success are fair, all pretexts are sufficient to warrant her hostility; but when the juncture is ill-suited to remonstrance or resentment, her anger brooks delay, and all affronts are to be borne. We are less interested in courting her present favour than in counteracting her future designs; and weaker grounds of offence may be taken then, than those which are given now.

These reasons apply with scarcely less cogency to France than to England; and we learn with pleasure that the expediency of making a similar appointment for France, is now under the consideration of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in that country. The union of the two powers may facilitate the execution, and increase the advantages of the measure to both of them.

As far as our own country is concerned, the successful though tardy nomination of a British diplomatic agent in Warsaw, affords an encouraging precedent. That nomination was not made till the last efforts of the Polish nation in the cause of its independence were terminated: and the value of the communications which have since been received through this channel, has shown with greater evidence the deplorable want of earlier and more timely information with respect to the resources of that unhappy country. We trust that this deficiency (though some of its consequences are irreparable) may now be still further supplied; and that a British agent in Cracow may ere long be able to report on the circumstances of a people which cannot be so rapidly changed by oppression, or annihilated by division, as not to retain an important influence on the politics of eastern Europe, and, therefore, to demand the attention as well as the compassion of England. At any rate, since Russia has allowed a British consul to take up his residence in the capital of that Polish kingdom, which is now fallen under her undivided sovereignty, she cannot refuse to acknowledge a similar agent in the free and independent city of Cracow, over

which she has no claim to exercise any authority beyond that of a partial protection.

We insist, therefore, on the measure which it has been the object of these pages to communicate to the British public ; and whilst we call the attention of our countrymen to a subject which so deeply concerns the honour and the interests of England, we are enabled, by a fortunate coincidence, to show that it has already excited the hopes of all that remains of Poland. In the *Morning Herald* of the 26th of October, we find the following evidence from the city of Cracow itself. Fresh abuses force themselves upon our attention ; fresh claims are heard ; fresh dangers are disclosed ; and every week which now elapses before the appointment of a British agent, may cost a privilege to Cracow, and rob Europe of another citizen. The recent occurrence to which we allude, is contained in the following paragraph, with which we conclude :—

“ From Cracow, under date 4th inst., letters have arrived, stating that the Russian consul in that republic had demanded the surrender to his government of a Polish refugee, named Zabicki, who had arrived there with a Belgian passport perfectly *en règle*. He demanded him as a conscript of the Empire, although he is banished by an Imperial Ukase. The Senate acquiesced in this demand, and delivered the unfortunate Pole over to his enemies. ‘ It were well,’ says the writer of this letter, ‘ that England should appoint an agent or consul to reside in Cracow, in virtue of the treaty of 1815, to inform his government of the perfect influence exercised by Russia on that *soi-disant* independent republic :’ and also to attend to the interests of the British trade, which are completely sacrificed by the subservient senate of Cracow to the will of Russia.”

MORNING HERALD, Oct. 26, 1835.

F I N I S.

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